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INTRODUCTION 
Houses of worship are more than mere bricks and mortar.  For congregants, they are 
sacred places of worship, contemplation, and fellowship.  For the community-at-large, churches 
define neighborhood skylines and often provide valuable social services.  For preservationists, 
churches represent some of the most ambitious (and controversial) architectural and design 
efforts of past generations.  As surrounding shops and residences have deteriorated or been 
destroyed for redevelopment, churches often remain, as symbols of times past.   
Historic preservation of churches can create unique tensions between congregations, 
which want to be able to alter or demolish their buildings to meet changing needs, and 
preservationists, who want to preserve their architectural integrity.  Historic preservation 
imposes substantial financial constraints on congregations.1  Landmarking may make 
maintenance more expensive and hinder the transferability of the property.2  Religious groups, 
citing the free exercise clause of the First Amendment3 and the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),4 claim that historic preservation laws do not apply to 
churches.  Preservationists argue that religious groups should not receive special exemptions 
from neutral laws of general applicability.   
This paper will analyze the tension between the historic preservation of sacred places and 
the free exercise of religion as seen through the recent controversy surrounding the landmarking 
of Third Church of Christ, Scientist, in Washington, D.C.  Assuming Third Church would bring a 
                                                 
1 See Melanie E. Homer, Landmarking Religious Institutions: The Burden of Rehabiltation and the Loss 
of Religious Freedom, 28 URB. LAWYER 327 (1996). 
2 See Stephen M. Watson, First Amendment Challenges to Historic Preservation Statutes, 11 FORDHAM 
URB. L. J. 115, 121 (1982); see also Evelyn B. Newell, Model Free Exercise Challenges for Religious 
Landmarks, 34 CASE W. RES. L. R. 144, 154-57 (1983) (describing in detail four hypothetical burdens on 
religious exercise). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
4 42 U.S.C. §2000cc (2000). 
 1
free exercise and RLUIPA challenge if the District denied a demolition permit, this paper will 
examine how such a suit would likely fail.   
After describing the factual background, the paper will evaluate questions of standing and 
ripeness.  The mere fact of landmarking does not create a cause of action recognized by District 
of Columbia courts, so any potential suit would have to be brought after administrative remedies 
are exhausted.  The paper will then analyze the potential challenge under pre-RLUIPA free 
exercise jurisprudence and conclude that despite cases to the contrary in Kansas and Washington 
State, the denial of a demolition permit is not a violation of free exercise under the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Employment Division v. Smith.5  The paper will then address the inherent 
contradictions within RLUIPA when religious entities try to invoke strict scrutiny to challenge 
historic preservation laws.  While claiming to codify existing free exercise jurisprudence and not 
confer immunity from land use regulations to religious entities, RLUIPA contradictorily seems 
to expand free exercise protections by triggering strict scrutiny review upon a showing of an 
“individualized assessment” by a government body in land use decisions.   
Although a District of Columbia court likely would not find the District’s denial of a 
demolition permit to violate the free exercise clause, a court’s determination of a RLUIPA 
violation is a much closer question and would depend on how it interprets “substantial burden.”  
Circuit courts are split, but the more compelling precedent suggests that the District’s insistence 
on preserving the landmarked church would not violate RLUIPA.  The mere denial of a 
demolition permit to Third Church--absent a showing by the church of economic hardship 
triggering a taking--would not violate the expanded protections afforded religious groups 
through RLUIPA because the denial does not make religious exercise “effectively impracticable” 
                                                 
5 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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and increased costs on religious beliefs are not alone a substantial burden.  
 
I. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE LANDMARKING OF THIRD CHURCH OF 
CHRIST, SCIENTIST 
Third Church of Christ, Scientist in Washington, D.C. does not look like a traditional 
church.  Situated two blocks north of the White House, the church is an octagonal structure, with 
high concrete, windowless walls, that stands in an unadorned plaza on 16th St. NW.  Araldo 
Cossutta, a principal architect in the renowned firm of I.M. Pei, designed the structure, which 
was finished in 1971.  The church is considered an example of Brutalist architecture—a mid-
twentieth century movement that emphasized the use of rough, poured-in-place concrete as the 
building medium.6   
In late 2007, the Committee of 100 of the Federal City and the District of Columbia 
Preservation League nominated the church for landmark status.  In December 2007, the District 
of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Board (HPRB), based on the testimony of multiple 
architects, architectural historians, and other knowledgeable experts regarding the building’s 
architectural significance,7 granted landmark status to the entire church complex: the octagonal 
                                                 
6 Paul Schwartzman, Church Gets Landmark Status over Congregation’s Objections, WASH. POST., Dec. 
7, 2007, at B03. 
7 D.C HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE, STAFF REPORT FOR THIRD CHURCH OF CHRIST, SCIENTIST (Nov. 
1, 2007) (on file with author). The Historic Preservation Office’s staff report noted that the church “was 
one of the best examples of Brutalism in the Washington area and one of the most important Modernist 
churches.”  Id. at 2.  In addition, the design won the Washington Board of Trade’s Award for Excellence 
in Architecture and a craftsmanship award for the concrete work from the Washington Building Congress.  
Id. at 4.  Thus, the church complex satisfied the Historic Preservation Review Board’s designation 
criterion F, for “notable works of craftsmen, artists, sculptors, architects, landscape architects, urban 
planners, engineers, builders, or developers whose works have influenced the evolution of their fields of 
endeavor, or are significant to the development of the District of Columbia or the nation.”  Id. at 10.  
Richard Longstreth, a George Washington University architectural history professor, testified before the 
board that the Third Church complex is “in a league of its own” as a “distinctive and original work.” 
Mark Fisher, State vs. Church: March of the Preservation Police, WASH. POST., Dec. 7, 2007, 
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church itself, the rectangular office building that housed the offices of the Christian Science 
Monitor, and the triangular courtyard between the church and office building.8  The congregation 
opposed the landmark designation at the December meeting.  They claimed the structure, which 
holds 400 people, was too large for the congregation of forty to sixty weekly worshippers.  The 
congregants expressed concern about the costs of maintaining the aging structure.  They also 
stated that the building’s fortress-like design impeded their worship and ability to attract new 
members.9    
The landmarking has frustrated the plans of the congregation.  The Mother Church of 
Christian Science had conveyed the property to a commercial real estate developer, ICG, who 
promised to construct a smaller sanctuary on the site.  At the landmarking hearing, the church 
was represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, a public interest law firm that 
provides legal services to religious organizations.10  Since the HPRB would have to issue a 
demolition permit for the developer to tear down the church, the church, through the Becket 
Fund, may choose to challenge a denial of that permit.  “We have let HPRB know that it is 
treading on dangerous ground,” said the church’s counsel.11 
 
II. BACKGROUND ON FREE EXERCISE LAW 
A. Supreme Court Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence has changed significantly over the past 
forty years and has been a source of much controversy.  In Sherbert v. Verner, the Warren Court 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/rawfisher/2007/12/state_vs_church_march_of_the_p.html. 
8 Schwartzman, supra note 6. 
9 Darrow Kirkpatrick, a congregant who opposed the designation, testified: “We know of no way to adapt 
the building to meet our needs….It’s not a welcoming building.” Schwartzman, supra note 6. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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held that burdens upon religious exercise were subject to strict scrutiny—that is, for the 
government action or law to survive judicial review the government had to assert both a 
compelling interest and that its action or law was narrowly tailored to achieve this objective.12  
Commentators saw this standard to be extremely favorable to religious groups.  The Sherbert 
compelling interest test was the prevailing free exercise standard until the Court’s 1990 decision 
in Employment Division v. Smith, which held that neutral, generally applicable laws were subject 
to rational basis review, not strict scrutiny.13  The Sherbert compelling interest test still applied 
to government action that was not neutral toward religion or generally applicable.   
There were however, two exceptions to the Smith rule imposing rational basis review.  
First, where the claim is “hybrid”—in that it combines free exercise with another constitutional 
right (like freedom of speech)—strict scrutiny is appropriate.14  Second, “where the State has in 
place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 
‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”15  The individualized exemption exception can 
be summarized as follows: as long as a law does not contain any exemptions, it is considered 
generally applicable and religious groups cannot claim a right to exemption; however, if a law 
has secular exemptions, then religious groups can challenge the law.16  In the words of the Tenth 
Circuit, “the general applicability test gives religious groups something akin to a disparate 
treatment claim.”17  By requiring the government to merely show a rational basis for its actions 
in most cases, the Court immediately made it more difficult for individuals and religious entities 
to bring successful free exercise challenges. 
                                                 
12 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
13 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990). 
14 Id. at 882.   
15 Id. at 884. 
16 See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 650 (10th Cir. 2006). 
17 Id. 
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B. RFRA   
Unsurprisingly, the Smith decision was not popular with certain constituencies.  Several 
years later Congress approved and President Clinton signed into law the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which attempted to overturn Smith and “restore” the 
compelling interest test for federal and state actions that “substantially burdened” the free 
exercise of religion, even if such burdens derived from neutral rules of general applicability.18  
Four years later, in City of Boerne v. Flores,19 the Supreme Court held RFRA to be 
unconstitutional, although subsequent courts have suggested that RFRA would still apply to 
federal governmental action.20   
The Court in City of Boerne dismissed a church’s RFRA challenge to a Texas town’s 
denial of a demolition permit for a historic sanctuary building.21  Although Congress may 
enforce constitutional rights pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in 
City of Boerne held that Congress had not simply enforced First Amendment rights but had 
exceeded its constitutional authority by defining the boundaries of those rights.22  The Court 
stressed that RFRA was out of proportion to its supposed remedial or preventative object, 
considering that Congress had presented no evidence in the legislative record of any widespread 
pattern of religious discrimination by states or the federal government.23  
 
C. RLUIPA 
Not dissuaded, Congress passed new legislation, the Religious Land Use and 
                                                 
18 See 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1 (2000). 
19 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
20 See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). 
21 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507. 
22 Id. at 508-09. 
23 Id. at 509. 
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Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), which President Clinton signed into law in 
September 2000.  RLUIPA reinstated the same general rule of RFRA: state action that 
substantially burdens religious exercise can be justified only as the “least restrictive means” of 
further a “compelling governmental interest.”24  However, RLUIPA, unlike RFRA, did not apply 
to all government action but only to state or federal government action involving land use or 
institutionalized persons.  Within the context of land use regulation, RLUIPA applies where the 
“burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use 
regulations, under which a government makes…individualized assessments of the proposed uses 
for the property involved.”25   
The purpose in passing RLUIPA’s land use provisions was to eliminate covert 
discrimination against religious groups by zoning boards.26  Despite its sweeping language, the 
statute was not intended to immunize religious institutions from local land use laws.27  
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA only in regard to its 
application to institutionalized persons.28  Lower courts have generally agreed that RLUIPA is 
constitutional in regard to land use regulations.29  However, no court has addressed RLUIPA’s 
constitutionality as applied to historic preservation laws, and the legislative record of RLUIPA 
                                                 
24 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-1(a) (2000). The full text of § 2000cc is in Appendix A. 
25 § 2000cc(a)(2).  
26 See Daniel Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: the Overbroad Applications and Troubling Implications 
of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805, 816 (2006). 
27 A joint statement issued by the sponsors of the legislation, Senators Hatch and Kennedy, explains, 
“This Act does not provide religious institutions with immunity form land use regulation, no does it 
relieve religious institutions from applying for variances, special permits or exceptions, hardship 
approval, or other relief provision in land use regulations, where available without discrimination or 
unfair delay.” 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000).  
28 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
29 See, e.g., United States v. Maui County, 298 F. Supp.2d 1010 (D. Haw. 2003) (upholding 
constitutionality of LUIPA against establishment clause, enforcement clause, commerce clause, and Tenth 
Amendment challenges); Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (upholding RLUIPA as valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement powers).   
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does not contain any examples of religious discrimination in the application of historic 
preservation ordinances.30   
Considering that the Supreme Court struck down RFRA in City of Boerne because 
Congress had not provided any evidence of religious discrimination to justify its use of its 
enforcement powers, RLUIPA as applied to the historic preservation context may well be 
unconstitutional.  Nevertheless, for this paper, the constitutionality of RLIUPA is assumed.   
Thus, under the current constitutional and statutory framework, an individual or religious 
entity can bring a challenge to a burdensome government action both under the First Amendment 
and under RLUIPA.  Part IV of his paper will analyze a potential challenge under the First 
Amendment and Part V will assess a claim under RLUIPA by Third Church. 
 
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF STANDING AND RIPENESS 
A. Standing 
The first issue that must be addressed is whether the church has standing to bring a free 
exercise or RLUIPA claim when it no longer owns the land.  The standing analysis is hindered 
by the uncertainty surrounding the terms of the church’s lease with the developer.  In all other 
cases where a religious organization has challenged historic preservation regulations, it has 
owned the property being regulated.31  In contrast, while the Christian Science Mother Church, 
based in Boston, originally owned the land on which Third Church currently sits and leased the 
land to the congregation, a developer currently owns the property and continues to lease it back 
to Third Church. 
                                                 
30 See Julia Miller, Regulating Historic Religious Properties Under RLUIPA, SL014 ALI-ABA 719, 731 
(2005). 
31 See, e.g., Soc’y of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm’n, 409 Mass. 38 (1990).  
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Standing for a Free Exercise Claim 
To have standing for a free exercise challenge, plaintiffs must prove that particular 
religious freedoms are or will be infringed.32  Third Church can assert that the burdens imposed 
by the historic preservation regulations limit the space in which the congregation worships and 
impose financial costs that detract from religious and social initiatives.  Moreover, the fact that 
no court has yet dismissed a challenge to a historic preservation law on standing grounds 
strongly suggests that even though Third Church does not own the property in question, it would 
still satisfy the standing requirements for a free exercise claim.33  
 
Standing for a RLUIPA claim 
The general rules of standing under Article III of the Constitution also governs standing 
for purposes of RLUIPA; so the standing analysis is identical for potential constitutional and 
statutory challenges.34  But RLUIPA’s protections only apply to two areas: institutionalized 
persons and land use regulations.  As a consequence, Third Church’s claim has to be related to a 
land use regulation in order for it to bring a suit.  
Nevertheless, courts have recognized that plaintiffs who have a definite but non-
possessory interest in the land—such as those who will receive the land as part of a contract or 
other agreement—do have standing to challenge zoning decisions.35  In Dilaura v. Ann Arbor 
Township, a religious organization entered into an agreement with a land development company 
                                                 
32 Sch. Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).  
33 However, the lack of a concrete property interest would implicate standing if Third Church sought to 
also bring a Fifth Amendment takings challenge.  This paper will not address a separate Fifth Amendment 
takings challenge, but Part VI analyzes how a “substantial burden” on religion resembles the burden of 
proving an unconstitutional taking. 
34 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-2(a) (2000). 
35 Dilaura v. Ann Arbor Charter Tp., 30 Fed. Appx. 501, 506 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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to receive a residential home for free, if the home could be used for religious purposes.  The 
court held that the contingency interest did not render the religious organization's interest 
unenforceable because a definite agreement existed.36   
The court cited RLUIPA, which defined a “land use regulation” that could be challenged 
under RLUIPA as any “zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits 
or restricts a claimant's use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the 
claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the 
regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.”37   Therefore, the religious 
group in Dilaura successfully met the standing requirement because it had an option to acquire a 
property interest in the property at issue.  
Without more information about the structure of the contractual agreement between the 
developer and Third Church, it is difficult to completely analyze the standing question.   
Nevertheless, if the developer and Third Church have a similar arrangement that grants Third 
Church some type of property interest, even if nothing more than a lease, Third Church can 
likely satisfy the standing requirement, particularly because courts sometimes liberalize standing 
requirements with respect to the raising of First Amendment issues.38   
 
B. Ripeness 
Assuming that that Third Church would have standing to bring a suit under both the First 
Amendment and RLUIPA, the next issue becomes at what point the challenge becomes ripe for 
judicial review.  The mere act of landmarking a historic church building does not present a 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). 
38 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (granting taxpayer-plaintiff standing to challenge funding 
scheme that allegedly violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). 
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justiciable controversy under the First Amendment.39 
In Metropolitan Baptist v. Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, the D.C. Court 
of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the church’s free exercise challenge to the inclusion of five 
church-owned rowhouses in the Greater 14th Street Historic District.40  The court stated that 
historic designation did not impede the current use of the buildings and that because the church 
had not yet applied for a permit to alter or demolish the rowhouses, its claim was based solely on 
harm that might occur in the future.41  The court stressed that one of the purposes of the ripeness 
doctrine was to protect “‘agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has 
been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties,’” and that 
allowing the church’s challenge to go forward in the absence of a final administrative decision 
would needlessly entangle the courts in administrative policies.42  
The Metropolitan Baptist court specifically declined to follow the precedent of the 
Washington State courts, which have found landmark designations, as applied, to be violations of 
free exercise under the federal and state constitutions.43  The Court of Appeals distinguished the 
Washington case partly on the grounds that the Washington State Constitution provided broader 
                                                 
39 Metro. Baptist Church v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Reg. Affairs, 918 A.2d 119 (D.C. 1998); see also 
Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 US. 985 
(1986) (rejecting church’s free exercise challenge to landmark designation where church had not yet 
applied for a permit).  But see First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner for the Seattle 
Landmarks Preservation Board, 916 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1996) (holding that landmark designation violated 
church’s free exercise under federal and state constitutions because the designation restricted the church’s 
ability to sell its property to further its religious mission); Munns v. Martin, 930 P.2d 318 (Wash. 1997) 
(holding that landmark designation of religious school is a violation of the state constitution).  The 
District Court of Connecticut held that in regard to a ripeness inquiry, it was not necessary to distinguish 
an RLUIPA claim from a First Amendment free exercise claim.  Murphy v. New Milford Zoning 
Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 350 (2d Cir. 2005).    
40 Id. at 130. 
41 Id. at 130. 
42 Id. at 130 (quoting Abbot Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)). 
43 Id. at 131-32 (distinguishing First United Methodist, 916 P.2d 374 (1996)). 
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protection for religious freedom than the federal constitution.44  
Thus, Third Church’s claim would not be ripe until the administrative decision was 
formalized; in other words, until the HPRB denied the demolition permit and the Mayor’s Agent, 
through the normal appeals process, affirmed the HPRB’s decision.  
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF A POTENTIAL CHALLENGE BY THIRD CHURCH  
UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
A. Historic preservation laws are neutral and generally applicable 
The threshold question in a free exercise challenge under the First Amendment is whether 
the government action allegedly burdening the exercise of religion is neutral and generally 
applicable.  If it is not, then strict scrutiny will apply.  But if the historic preservation regulation 
is neutral and generally applicable and the regulations do not involve hybrid rights and do not 
have individualized exemptions, then rational basis will apply. 
Historic preservation laws are neutral and of general applicability—and can thus burden 
free exercise—because they do not aim to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their 
religious motivation and do not in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated 
by religious belief.45  The Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City 
of Hialeah strongly suggests that historic preservation laws may be viewed as generally 
                                                 
44 Id. at 132.  In a footnote, the court also distinguished First United Methodist on the grounds that the 
church in that case was suffering from deterioration, unlike the rowhouses of Metropolitan Baptist, and 
that repairs would only be affordable absent government regulations.  This footnote suggests that if a 
court finds that Third Church is deteriorating and maintenance costs would be prohibitively expensive, 
the church may have a stronger case of distinguishing Metropolitan Baptist.  Nevertheless, it is unlikely 
that even this would overcome the court’s reluctance to intervene before a final administrative 
determination.  
45 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993); see also San Jose 
Christian Coll., 360 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that city’s denial of Christian college’s 
petition for rezoning was not targeted on basis of religion and thus not a violation of free exercise.) 
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applicable, even if a demolition permit may be denied through an individualized hearing process.  
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in applying Lukumi to a zoning ordinance, explained that in 
order for a plaintiff to invoke strict scrutiny, the individual must present evidence “suggesting 
that the ordinance was passed due to religious animus”; evidence showing that “the city 
specifically targeted religious groups . . . in its enforcement of the ordinance”; or evidence that 
the municipality, through its ordinances, “ha[d] ‘devalue[d] religious reasons . . . by judging 
them to be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons.’”46 
The animosity toward religious practice addressed in Lukumi is not relevant here, because 
local historic preservation boards only decide to landmark buildings that meet specific threshold 
criteria, which are predetermined, explicit, and not religiously motivated.47   The HPRB voted to 
landmark Third Church because of the church’s architecture, not out of any religious 
motivation.48  While the decision to landmark a particular building does involve discretion and 
subjective tastes about aesthetics, the majority of the Supreme Court in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York explicitly stated that subjective elements considered in 
the landmarking process do not make the final decision arbitrary.49  Instead, historic 
                                                 
46 Grace United, 451 F.3d 643, 650 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537).  
47 For the seven criteria that HPRB uses in determining whether to approve landmark status, see 10 
DCMR § 200.1 (2002). Some confusion here. The first sentence correctly refers to the regs; but the 
second, is a non-sequitur ; and comes from the statute??  For example, subsection (e) provides: “No 
permit shall be issued unless the Mayor finds that issuance of the permit is necessary in the public 
interest, or that failure to issue a permit will result in unreasonable economic hardship to the owner.” § 
200.1(e). 
48 In contrast, the Supreme Court struck down a municipal ordinance that criminalized animal sacrifice 
within city limits because the Court found that the city council, in passing the ordinance, was motivated 
by animus toward Santerians and excluded many other activities that killed animals (medical research, 
butchers) from the ban. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 530.  
49 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978). “[C]ontrary to appellants’ suggestions, landmark laws are not like 
discriminatory, or ‘reverse spot,’ zoning: that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a 
particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones…. In contrast to 
discriminatory zoning, which is the antithesis of land-use control as part of some comprehensive plan, the 
New York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest 
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preservation, like zoning, is generally applicable because it treats similar property in a similar 
manner within a generally applicable scheme.50  In St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New 
York, the Second Circuit explicitly held that landmarks laws are “facially neutral regulations of 
general applicability within the meaning of Supreme Court decisions.”51  In addition, the 
Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores assumed in dicta that the preservation ordinance at 
issue was a law of general application.52  Therefore, historic preservation laws are likely both 
neutral and generally applicable.   
 
B. Regulation of religious property does not implicate freedom of speech 
Assuming historic preservation laws are neutral and generally applicable, plaintiffs may 
still attempt to invoke strict scrutiny under Smith by asserting a hybrid claim: that the historic 
preservation law infringes both free exercise and free speech.53  Professor Angela Carmella 
argues that because architecture is closely intertwined with expression, religious architecture 
constitutes religious speech and is consequently protected not only by the Free Exercise Clause 
but also the Free Speech Clause.54  “The semiotic nature of the house of worship,” she writes, 
                                                                                                                                                             
wherever they might be found in the city…. Equally without merit is the related argument that the 
decision to designate a structure as a landmark “is inevitably arbitrary or at least subjective, because it is 
basically a matter of taste.”  Id. 
50 Id. 
51 St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 353 (2nd Cir. 1990).  
52 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, 513-14 (1997). 
53 The hybrid rights claim is not without controversy.  As the Tenth Circuit in Grace United stated, “The 
hybrid rights doctrine…. has been characterized as mere dicta not binding on lower courts, Knight v. 
Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir.2001); criticized as illogical, Kissinger v. Bd. of 
Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993); and dismissed as untenable.” Grace United, 451 
F.3d 643, 656 (D. Wyo. 2006).  For simplicity, this paper assumes the validity of the hybrid rights 
exception in Smith.  
54 See Angela Carmella, Landmark Preservation of Church Property, 34 CATH. LAW. 41, 60 (1991); 
Russell S. Bonds, First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle: The Washington Supreme Court Fortifies the 
Free Exercise Rights of Religious Landmarks Against Historic Preservation Restrictions, Comment, 27 
GA. L. REV. 589, 614 (1992)  
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“renders its ‘religious’ and ‘aesthetic’ aspects indistinguishable.”55  Therefore, when the 
government attempts to control ecclesiastical design for purely aesthetic reasons,56 it “severely 
compromises the religious community’s freedom to adapt its worship structure to its liturgical, 
theological, doctrinal, and missional goals” as well as the congregation’s ability to protect its 
“expression and vitality.”57   The Washington State courts in First Covenant Church v. City of 
Seattle and First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner for Seattle Landmarks 
Preservation Board embraced this idea that ecclesiastical architecture is an expression of 
religious ideas and that landmarking churches implicated both free speech and free exercise.58   
In striking down Seattle’s landmark designation of First Covenant Church, the court held 
that “regulation of the church’s exterior impermissibly infringes on the religious organization’s 
right to free exercise and free speech.”59  Moreover, in Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks 
Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, citing its state constitution, struck down the 
interior designation of a Jesuit church because the “configuration of the church interior is so 
freighted with religious meaning that it must be considered part and parcel of the Jesuits’ 
religious worship.”60 
However, unlike Society of Jesus, the landmark designation for Third Church only 
applies to the exterior of the building, and Washington remains the only state to have made 
                                                 
55 Angela Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark 
Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 401, 405 (1991).  
56 Prof. Carmella does not dispute that health and safety regulations would trump this freedom of 
ecclesiastical architectural expression. Id.  
57 Id. 
58 First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 182 (1992) (“The relationship between 
theological doctrine and architectural design is well recognized.”); First United Methodist Church v. 
Seattle Landmarks Preservation Bd., 916 P.2d 374 (1996) (“[T]he Landmarks Preservation Ordinance 
posed a potential threat to both the free exercise of religion and free speech….”). 
59 First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 182. 
60 564 N.E.2d 571, 573 (1990).  
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landmark designation subject to a hybrid claim.  Although the issue of a hybrid claim was not 
before the D.C. Court of Appeals in Metropolitan Baptist, that court’s distinguishing of First 
United Methodist and First Covenant make it likely that the Court of Appeals would also reject 
the hybrid claim argument.61  Moreover, the Washington State cases conflicts with the Supreme 
Court’s dicta in Berman v. Parker, which suggests that even municipal regulations solely based 
on aesthetics (and without any historic element) would be constitutionally permissible and not 
subject to First Amendment challenges.62    
In addition, the California courts have rejected the idea that land use regulations always 
implicate the Free Speech Clause.  In San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that zoning ordinances that restrict religious entities from 
fully developing their properties do not implicate the Free Speech Clause unless the ordinances 
contain content-based discrimination or unless the city enacted or enforced the ordinances as a 
“pretext for suppressing expression.”63  In San Jose Christian, the city denied a religious group’s 
petition to rezone a parcel to educational use.  The religious college, the owner of the property, 
claimed that the building on the property was itself “speech.”64  Ignoring the idea that the 
property itself constituted symbolic speech, the court, in upholding the rezoning denial, instead 
looked to the effect and purpose behind the ordinance.65  The court held that because the 
ordinance did not prohibit all religious uses within the city and was not a “pretext for suppressing 
expression,”66 it was not a content-based restriction on religious speech.67  The court 
                                                 
61 See Metro. Baptist Church v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Reg. Affairs, 718 A.2d 119, 132 (D.C. 1998). 
62 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).  
63 360 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004).  
64 Id. at 1032.  
65 Id.  
66 Id. (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986)).  
67 Id. at 1032. 
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distinguished cases where land use laws were subject to free speech protections because those 
cases involved adult movie theaters that the city was attempting to zone out of existence.68  
Because Morgan Hill was not motivated by a disdain of the college’s religious orientation, or by 
the message that would have been communicated by the property, “no viable impingement of 
speech claim has been asserted.”69   
Similarly, the District’s landmarking of religious buildings does not prohibit all religious 
uses within the city and is not a pretext for suppressing expression.  The landmark designation 
does not prevent religious uses within the landmarked building; it merely prevents a change in 
the status quo.  While the preservation restrictions undoubtedly impose costs on religious 
exercise, courts generally have not considered the effects of freezing current uses sufficient to 
rise to the level of an economic taking or a substantial burden on free exercise.70  In addition, the 
District’s historic preservation regulations, like the zoning ordinance in Morgan Hill, is not a 
pretext for suppressing religious speech and was not motivated by disdain for religion.  
Therefore, absent a showing of discriminatory treatment, the District courts likely would dismiss 
Third Church’s hybrid claim. 
 
C. The denial of a demolition permit is not an individualized exemption under Smith 
In a First Amendment challenge, the issue of whether the historic preservation laws 
contain individualized exemptions—and thus fall under Sherbert’s compelling interest test—is a 
much closer case.  Courts have disagreed on whether preservation ordinances contain a system of 
                                                 
68 Id. at 1032 (discussing Renton v. Playtime Theaters). 
69 Id. at 1032.  
70 See St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 905 (1991) (holding that no First Amendment violation occurs absent a showing of discriminatory 
motive, coercion in religious practice, or an inability to carry out its religious mission in its existing 
facilities).  
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individualized exemptions.71  Nevertheless, the individualized exemption exception to the 
rational basis test articulated by the Supreme Court in Smith and applied in Lukumi should not be 
read to provide religious entities “special treatment,” so long as the administrator has some 
criteria to narrow decision-making and there is no evidence of religious discrimination. 
 
Five circuits refuse to apply strict scrutiny notwithstanding individualized exemptions 
The Second, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that land use or 
historic preservation regulations do not trigger strict scrutiny notwithstanding the fact that they 
may have individualized procedures for obtaining special use permits or variances.72  In Grace 
United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, the Tenth Circuit declined to apply strict scrutiny 
to the town’s denial of a license authorizing a religious day care center.73  The court rejected a 
per se test that would subject any land use regulation to strict scrutiny and adopted a fact-specific 
inquiry to determine the existence of discriminatory animus or an application of the rule in “a 
discriminatory fashion that disadvantages religious groups or organizations.”74   
The Tenth Circuit distinguished the land use exemptions at issue in Grace United from 
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson.  In Axson-Flynn, the court found that a system of individualized 
exemptions might exist where a Mormon student in an actor’s training program had been 
                                                 
71 Compare id. (holding landmark law to be generally applicable) with Mt. St. Scholastica v. City of 
Atchison, 482 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Kan. 2007) (holding historic preservation to be a system of 
individualized exemptions).  
72 See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 651 (10th Cir. 2006); First 
Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 423 (11th Cir. 1994); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City 
of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 (8th Cir.1991); Mt. Elliott Cemetery Ass’n v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398, 
405 (6th Cir.1999); St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir.1990); 
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 157 F. Supp. 2d 903, 914-15 (N.D. Ill. 2001), 
aff’d, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003). 
73 Grace United, 451 F.3d at 651. 
74 Id. at 651. 
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required, while reciting a script, to utter certain words offensive to her religious beliefs, but a 
Jewish student had received permission to miss certain class exercises for religious reasons 
without suffering adverse consequences.75  In addition to the absence of any criteria for the 
university to exempt students from the academic program, the court also stressed the possibility 
of religious animus.76  The court in Grace United thus reasoned that although special use permits 
or variances generally require individualized assessments about the property, the ordinances are 
motivated by secular purposes and equally impact all land owners within the city that seek a 
variance or special use permit.77   
In St. Bartholomew’s, the Second Circuit assumed without deciding that the demolition 
provision in the New York City landmarks law did not constitute an individualized exemption.  
Although the exemption exception was announced by the Supreme Court in Smith before the 
Second Circuit decided St. Bartholomew’s, the Second Circuit ultimately decided it was worth 
only a brief mention.  Acknowledging that the landmarks law “accords great discretion” to the 
city’s Landmarks Commission, the court went on to state that “absent proof of the discriminatory 
exercise of discretion” such discretion was constitutionally irrelevant.78  The court compared 
historic preservation to zoning, in which “the exercise of discretion is [hardly] constrained by 
scientific principles or unaffected by selfish or political interests,” and which “passes 
                                                 
75 Id. 
76 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1294, 1298-99 (10th Cir. 2004). 
77 Grace United, 451 F.3d at 651 (“[S]everal federal courts have held that land use regulations…are 
neutral and generally applicable notwithstanding that they may have individualized procedures for 
obtaining special use permits or variances….According to these courts…[zoning laws] are generally 
applicable if they are motivated by secular purposes and impact equally all land owners in the city 
seeking variances.”); Collier County, 20 F.3d at 423-24; City of Troy, 171 F.3d at 405; Civil Liberties, 
157 F.Supp.2d at 914-15. 
78 St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354-55 (2nd Cir. 1990). 
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constitutional muster.”79   
Interestingly, on the very day the Supreme Court denied certiorari in St. Bartholomew’s, 
it vacated and remanded the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in First Covenant for 
further consideration in light of Smith, thereby implying that Seattle’s historic preservation law 
did not warrant strict scrutiny.80  While the denial of certiorari is not binding precedent, the 
Supreme Court has effectively endorsed the Second Circuit’s opinion in St. Bartholomew’s by 
denying certiorari in that case and by vacating and remanding First Covenant.  
 
A few courts have found individualized exemptions and have applied strict scrutiny 
However, several courts have held otherwise and applied strict scrutiny.  In Keeler v. 
Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, the District Court of Maryland held that the city’s 
preservation ordinance had implemented a system of individualized exemptions that triggered 
strict scrutiny.81  The court analyzed the circumstances under which the preservation board could 
allow an alteration or demolition of a protected property: when the retention of the landmark 1) 
would prevent a “major improvement program which will be of substantial benefit to the City,” 
2) “would cause undue financial hardship,” or 3) “would not be to the best interest of a majority 
of persons in the community.”82   
The court thus concluded that the city’s ordinance embodied a legislative judgment that 
the city’s interest in historic preservation should, in some individual circumstances, give way to 
                                                 
79 Id. at 355.  
80 Homer, supra note 1, at 341.  While the denial of certiorari in St. Bartholomew’s and the vacation and 
remand “appeared to make First Covenant an easy victory for preservationists,” the Washington court 
surprisingly refused to change its opinion in light of Smith and grounded its second decision in the state 
constitution to isolate it from further review. Id. at 342. 
81 Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 886 (D. Md. 1996).  
82 Id. at 886.  
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other interests, such as furthering major development and exempting property owners from 
financial hardship.  The Cumberland ordinance regarding demolition of historic landmarks is 
similar to the District of Columbia’s.  Section 6-1104 of the District of Columbia Code states, 
“No permit shall be issued unless the Mayor finds that issuance of the permit is necessary in the 
public interest, or that failure to issue a permit will result in unreasonable economic hardship to 
the owner.”83  The statute lists detailed information required for a finding of economic 
hardship,84 but the finding of “in the public interest” is a subjective determination.  Although 
Maryland and Kansas would apply strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court’s decision to deny cert in 
St. Bartholomew’s and vacate First Covenant in the same term strongly suggests that the Court 
considers historic preservation laws as neutral, generally applicable laws not subject to strict 
scrutiny. 
 
D. The required maintenance of a landmarked church is not necessarily a 
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion  
The strict scrutiny inquiry asks whether the government has placed a substantial burden 
on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling 
governmental interest justifies the burden.85  It is a “basic precept” of First Amendment 
jurisprudence that not every governmental act that burdens religion violates the free exercise 
clause: “The First Amendment is only offended if there is a substantial burden on religious 
exercise.”86  Consequently, even if a court in the District of Columbia were to apply the 
individualized exemption of Smith, thereby triggering strict scrutiny, Third Church still must 
                                                 
83 D.C. Code § 6-1104(e) (2000). 
84 See § 6-1104(g).  The full text of this section is in Appendix B. 
85 Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). 
86 Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Tp., 2004 WL 1837037 at 5 (E.D. Pa. 2004) 
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show a substantial burden on its religious exercise for its free exercise claim to prevail.  Because 
courts repeatedly have held that indirect financial or aesthetic burdens on religious groups are not 
substantial, the denial of a demolition permit likely would not rise to the level of a substantial 
burden on religion.  
Substantial burdens arise when the government coerces a person to engage in an action 
that violates a fundamental tenet of his or her genuinely held religious beliefs.87  Substantial 
burdens also occur when the government forces an individual to choose between following a 
basic tenet of his or her faith and forfeiting a government benefit.88  However, states do not 
substantially burden religious exercise when laws indirectly make the practice of religion more 
expensive.89  In Brownfield v. Brown, the Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing 
law, even though it imposed a serious financial burden on an Orthodox Jew, whose faith 
prevented him from also working on Saturday.90  Although the state law increased financial 
hardship and made practicing one’s religion more difficult, the Court held that the law did not 
interfere with or impede a religious observation.91   
A refusal by a landmarking body to allow religious groups to alter or demolish historic 
structures has never been held to be a substantial burden upon free exercise.92  In St. 
                                                 
87 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that state law requiring Amish parents to send 
their children to high school a substantial burden on free exercise). 
88 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (finding free exercise violation when Seventh Day 
Adventist was forced to choose between working on Saturday—which her faith prohibited—and 
receiving generally available unemployment benefits). 
89 See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); see also Lakewood Cong. of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. 
v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (1983) (finding no substantial burden when city zoning ordinance 
required new religious groups to purchase land in the expensive commercial section of the city for 
religious structures).  
90 Braunfield, 366 U.S. at 605.  
91 Id.  
92 See St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2nd Cir. 1990); First Church of 
Christ, Scientist v. Historic Dist. Com’n of Ridgefield, 738 A.2d 224 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998), aff’d, 737 
A.2d 989 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999), cert. denied, 742 A.2d 358 (1999) (holding that denial of alteration of 
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Bartholomew’s, the Second Circuit rejected an Episcopal church’s claim that the city’s refusal to 
allow it to tear down an historic auxiliary building was a violation of free exercise.93  The church 
sought permission to replace its community building with a forty-seven story office tower.94   
The developer partnering with Third Church plans to replace the church with an office 
building as well.  Citing its weak financial condition, the unsuitability of the building for its 
activities, and the cost of structural and mechanical repairs of its historic property, St. 
Bartholomew’s—like Third Church—claimed the new office tower would provide better space 
for its activities and generate needed revenues.95  While the preservation law “drastically 
restricted” the church’s opportunity to raise funds and to expand its activities, the Second Circuit 
held that the denial of the demolition permit did not prevent the church from following its beliefs 
and was thus not a violation of the free exercise clause.96   
Key to the court’s holding in St. Bartholomew’s was the church’s inability to prove it 
could no longer continue its religious practice in its historic structure.  Thus, for Third Church to 
escape from the weight of St. Bartholomew’s precedent, it must assert that the current structure 
effectively prevents its religious practice.  The fact that religious practice might be better served 
in a new facility is irrelevant.  While Third Church can argue that the present structure is 
foreboding and unwelcoming, they will likely be unable to prove that the facility is unsuitable for 
religious exercise, especially because the church originally approved the architect’s plans. 
However, courts in Washington, Kansas, and Maryland have held that historic 
                                                                                                                                                             
historic church was not a substantial burden); Diocese of Toledo v. Toledo County-Lucas County 
Planning Comm’n, No. L-98-1150 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, No. L.98-1150 (Ohio 
App. Ct. 1999), 1999 WL 128563 (Ohio App. 6 Dist.) (holding that denial of permission to tear down 
house for church parking lot was not an undue burden on the church’s free exercise).  
93 St. Bartholomew’s, 914 F.2d at 355. 
94 Id. at 352. 
95 Id. at 353-54. 
96 Id. at 355. 
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preservation laws impose unconstitutional burdens on religion.  For example, in First Covenant 
Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, the Washington State Supreme Court held that Seattle’s 
historic preservation ordinances, as applied, burdened religious exercise “administratively,” by 
requiring a religious entity to seek the approval before alteration or demolition, and 
“financially,” by reducing the value of the landmarked property by fifty percent.97  The court 
acknowledged that not all financial burdens upon religion violate free exercise but found that the 
fifty-percent reduction in value of the church property at issue was a “gross” financial burden.98   
In Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, the United States District Court of 
Maryland held that a city’s refusal to allow demolition of a monastery and chapel in a historic 
district violated the free exercise under federal and Maryland constitutions.99  The Catholic 
Archdiocese of Baltimore wanted to demolish an historic structure and replace it with a newer 
building in order to improve accessibility, parking, and meeting space.100  The Keeler court 
found that the city’s historic preservation law contained a series of individualized exceptions and 
applied strict scrutiny.101  However, the court accepted as true the archdiocese’s claims that the 
denial of the demolition permit burdened its free exercise rights and applied strict scrutiny 
without determining whether those free exercise rights were substantially burdened. 
Similarly, in Mount St. Scholastica, Inc. v. City of Atchison, the United States District 
Court in Kansas, applying strict scrutiny, held that a city’s denial of a demolition permit for an 
historic monastic property violated the free exercise clause.102  The city did not dispute that 
burdened religious practice, so the court, like the Maryland court in Keeler, accepted as true the 
                                                 
97 First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 183 (1992).  
98 Id.  
99 Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 887 (D. Md. 1996) 
100 Id. at 883. 
101 Id. 
102 482 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1295 (D. Kan. 2007). 
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plaintiff’s alleged burden on religious exercise without once analyzing whether the alleged 
burden was substantial.103  
Although First Covenant, Keeler, and Mount St. Scholastica directly conflict with the 
holding of St. Bartholomew’s, these three cases are distinguishable.  The courts in Keeler and 
Mount St. Scholastica did not analyze whether a substantial burden had occurred.  Although First 
Covenant held a fifty-percent reduction in value to be a substantial burden, even if Third Church 
were to prove such a reduction, the Washington court’s opinion would not be compelling 
precedent.  The Washington State Supreme Court, acknowledging its dislike of the new Smith 
test,104 also grounded its decision in the Washington State Constitution, which is “significantly 
different and stronger than the federal Constitution.”105  While the First Amendment limits 
government action that prohibits free exercise, the Washington Constitution “absolutely” 
protects freedom of worship and prohibits any conduct that merely “disturbs” religious 
conduct.106  Therefore, in light of the unique provisions of the Washington Constitution, First 
Covenant would be inapplicable in the District of Columbia.   
Moreover, the application of strict scrutiny without a finding of a substantial burden in 
Keeler and Mount St. Scholastica conflicts with Supreme Court dicta in Smith.  Fearing the 
“anarchy” that would result from a liberal application of strict scrutiny to neutral laws, the 
majority in Smith cautioned: “[W]e cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, 
as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest 
of the highest order.  The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally 
                                                 
103 Id. at 1292. 
104 The Washington State Supreme Court criticized the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Smith 
as “depart[ing] from a long history of established law and adopt[ing] a test that places free exercise in a 
subordinate, instead of preferred, position.” Id. at 187.   
105 Id. at 186. 
106 Id. at 186.  
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required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind….”107  
Even Justice O’Connor, who dissented in Smith and wanted to preserve the Sherbert 
compelling interest test, recognized that courts must first consider the scope of the alleged 
burden: the proper approach is “to determine whether the burden on the specific plaintiffs before 
us is constitutionally significant and whether the particular criminal interest asserted by the State 
before us is compelling.”108  Therefore, by applying strict scrutiny before determining whether a 
substantial burden on religious has occurred, the courts in Keeler and Mount St. Scholastica 
depart from the proper compelling interest test they purport to follow. 
 
V. ANALYSIS OF A POTENTIAL SUIT UNDER RLUIPA 
A. Protections to religious exercise under RLUIPA 
As discussed above, RLUIPA prohibits the federal and state governments from imposing 
substantial burdens on religious exercise unless the government shows its action is the least 
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.109  RLUIPA does not define what 
constitutes a “substantial burden” of religious exercise, but it expands the scope of “religious 
exercise” to include not only “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central 
to, a system of religious belief” but also “the use, building, or conversion of real property” for 
religious purposes.110   
The substantial burden analysis under RLUIPA is supposed to be identical to that under 
the First Amendment, and yet different outcomes have resulted in a few courts.111  Sen. Orrin 
                                                 
107 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-89 (1990).  
108 Id. at 899. (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
109 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000).  
110 § 2000cc-5(7)(A)-(B). 
111 See Congregation of Kol Ami v. Abington Township, 2004 WL 1837037 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (finding that 
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Hatch (R-UT), one of the sponsors of RLUIPA, explained to the Senate, “it is not the intent of 
this Act to create a new standard for the definition of ‘substantial burden’ on religious exercise. 
Instead, that term as used in the Act should be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.”112 
But not all courts have agreed with Sen. Hatch’s interpretation.  The United States 
District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania commented, “Viewed in the light that the 
RLUIPA effectively changed the type of burdens that require judicial intervention, it appears that 
there are two types of burdens on the exercise of religion: those defined by free exercise case law 
both prior to and during the effectiveness of the RFRA, and those that have been recognized 
since the passage of the RLUIPA.”113  Thus, according to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a 
government action can be a violation of RLUIPA but not a violation of the free exercise 
clause.114  This problem arises because the language of the statute conflicts with its legislative 
history.115  RLUIPA was intended to remedy intentional discrimination against religion in zoning 
decisions, yet if interpreted broadly the statute can give religious organizations a per se 
exemption from historic preservation regulations even in the absence of discrimination.116 
As discussed above, RLUIPA applies only in specific contexts; the most relevant of 
which in this case is when a substantial burden results from a regulation that allows the 
                                                                                                                                                             
denial of variance not a free exercise violation but a violation under RLUIPA).  
112 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Hatch continued: “Nothing 
in this Act, including the requirement in Section 5(g) that its terms be broadly construed, is intended to 
change that principle. The term ``substantial burden'' as used in this Act is not intended to be given any 
broader interpretation than the Supreme Court's articulation of the concept of substantial burden or 
religious exercise.” Id.  
113 Kol Ami, 2004 WL 1837037 at 8-9.  However, it should be noted that Kol Ami is an unreported 
opinion and therefore lacks precedential weight.   
114 See id.; see also Dilaura v. Ann Arbor Charter Tp., No. 00-1846, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 3135, at *20 
(6th Cir. 2002) (holding that denial of variance seeking to use a donated house for a religious retreat was a 
substantial burden under RLUIPA but not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause). 
115 See Lennington, supra note 26, at 834.  
116 See id. at 835. 
 27
government to make “individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property 
involved.”117  There are two components in the analysis: whether the regulation makes 
individualized assessments and whether a substantial burden exists.  If the regulation does not 
make individualized assessments, then even if the regulation substantially burdens free exercise, 
RLUIPA does not apply.  Additionally, if the regulation does make individualized assessments, 
RLUIPA will not be relevant unless there is a substantial burden.   
 
B. Individualized assessments and strict scrutiny  
The “individualized assessments” language in RLUIPA purposefully mirrors and codifies 
the “individualized exemption” language in Smith.  The general consensus of courts is that 
RLUIPA encompasses zoning and historic preservation laws that allow for individualized 
exemptions.118   
For example, in Episcopal Student Foundation v. City of Ann Arbor, a federal district 
court found that a denial of a demolition permit for a contributing building in a historic district 
constituted an individualized assessment.119  And in Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. City of West 
Linn, the Oregon Court of Appeals stated that even though zoning or preservation ordinances 
“are neutral laws of general applicability, their application to particular facts nevertheless can 
constitute an individualized assessment—particularly where…the application does to involve a 
mere numerical or mechanistic assessment, but on involving criteria that are at least partially 
                                                 
117 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2000). 
118 See Freedom Baptist Church v. Tp. of Middleton, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868-69 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(holding that zoning ordinances impose individual assessments involving case-by-case evaluation of the 
propriety of proposed activity against the ordinance); Shepherd Montessori Center Milan v. Ann Arbor 
Charter Tp., 675 N.W.2d 271 (Mich. App. Ct. 2003) (finding that denial of variance constituted 
“individualized assessment” under RLUIPA). 
119 341 F. Supp. 2d 691, 698 (2004). 
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subjective in nature.”120   
Even though the HPRB applies criteria in its decision of whether or not to deny a 
demolition permit, the criteria are nevertheless subjective and require individualized 
assessments.  For example, § 6-1104 of the D.C. Code prohibits any demolition permit for a 
landmark from being issued unless the Mayor finds the permit  “is necessary in the public 
interest” or that a failure to issue the permit “will result in unreasonable economic hardship to the 
owner.”121   
The term “necessary in the special interest” is defined as being consistent with the 
purposes of the act or necessary to create a project “of special merit.”122  A project can be 
considered of special merit if it contains “exemplary architecture,” “specific features of land 
planning,” or “social or other benefits.”123  Each of these determinations requires an individual, 
fact specific assessment.  In addition, while the Code standardizes the economic hardship review 
by listing specific financial information an owner must submit,124 the determination of whether 
the hardship is unreasonable is nevertheless individualized.   
Thus, even absent any evidence of discrimination, RLUIPA is triggered because the 
denial of a demolition permit would require an individualized assessment.   
 
 
 
                                                 
120 Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. City of West Linn, 86 P.3d 1140, 1148 (Or. App. Ct. 2004) (finding that 
denial of variance to construct church was individualized assessment, although not a substantial burden 
on religious exercise).  
121 D.C. Code § 6-1104(e) (2000). 
122 § 6-1102(10).  
123 § 6-1102(11). 
124 § 6-1104(g). 
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C. Historic preservation of a religious property does not create a substantial burden 
unless religious exercise is effectively impracticable 
It is important to note that strict scrutiny is not automatically invoked once an 
individualized assessment is found.  Every zoning and historic preservation system has 
exemptions and requires individualized assessments, and to impose strict scrutiny without any 
other showing would effectively create immunity from any individualized assessment, whether a 
variance or permit.  Such an interpretation of RLUIPA conflicts with the legislative intent of 
Congress when passing the Act.  In describing the effects of RLUIPA, the Senate sponsors of the 
Act stated, “This Act does not provide religious institutions with immunity from land use 
regulation, nor does it relieve religious institutions from applying for variances, special permits 
or exceptions, hardship approval, or other relief provisions in land use regulations, where 
available without discrimination or unfair delay.”125   
Therefore, the fact that Congress intended religious groups to apply for variances and 
special permits shows that Congress intended many of these variances and permits to be upheld 
under RLUIPA unless something else was shown: a substantial burden on religious exercise. 
Once it is determined that RLUIPA applies because an individualized assessment is 
made, the crucial question becomes whether a substantial burden exists.  Once a substantial 
burden is found, local preservation ordinances will rarely survive strict scrutiny review, in part 
because historic preservation has never been held to constitute a compelling state interest.126  
While RLUIPA does not define substantial burden, the legislative history states that courts 
should “reference…Supreme Court jurisprudence” to establish what constitutes a substantial 
                                                 
125 146 CONG. REC. 7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
126 See Mt. St. Scholastica v. City of Atchison, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1294 (D. Kan. 2007) (citing Keeler 
v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 886 (D. Md. 1996)).  
 30
burden.127  Indeed, recent Supreme Court decisions show that the substantial burden test is a 
difficult standard to meet128 and is rarely satisfied without a showing of coercion,129 animus 
toward religion,130 or the threat of criminal sanctions for religiously motivated activities.131 
 
Five circuits narrowly interpret “substantial burden” 
The Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have narrowly interpreted the term 
“substantial burden,” holding that inconveniences or financial difficulties do not rise to the level 
of substantial burdens.  The Second Circuit, suggesting in dicta that a town’s denial of a special 
use permit for a religious day care center would not be a substantial burden, cautioned that if 
RLUIPA is construed too broadly, “a serious question arises whether it goes beyond the proper 
function of protecting the free exercise of religion into the constitutionally impermissible zone of 
entwining government with religion in a manner that prefers religion over irreligion and confers 
special benefits on it.”132  In other words, courts should narrowly interpret what constitutes a 
substantial burden on religion to avoid a potential Establishment Clause violation. 
The Seventh Circuit, in one of the first cases addressing the question of what constituted 
a substantial burden under RLUIPA, recognized that although RLUIPA expanded the definition 
of religious exercise to include mere use of property for religious purposes, not every 
                                                 
127 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000). 
128 See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (finding no substantial burden when Sunday 
closing law merely made practice of religion more expensive); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) 
(finding no substantial burden even though government’s use of social security number would allegedly 
negatively affect plaintiff’s soul); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 
(1988) (finding no substantial burden when government built road through forest held sacred by Native 
Americans because action interfered with, but did not coerce, individual beliefs). 
129 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (finding substantial burden when individual forced to 
choose “between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and 
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion…on the other”). 
130 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). 
131 Id.  
132 Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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infringement on use would be substantial.  In upholding Chicago’s requirement of a special use 
permit for any church that sought to operate in a business or commercial zone, the court reasoned 
that applying the substantial burden provision to any government action or regulation that 
constrained the use of property for religious purposes “would render meaningless the word 
‘substantial,’ because the slightest obstacle to religious exercise incidental to the regulation of 
land use—however minor the burden it were to impose—could then constitute a burden 
sufficient to trigger” RLUPIA’s strict scrutiny.133  Thus, the Seventh Circuit defined a substantial 
burden for RLUIPA purposes as a government action that “necessarily bears direct, primary, and 
fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise--including the use of real property for 
the purpose thereof within the regulated jurisdiction generally--effectively impracticable.”134  
The court justified its holding by claiming that a broader interpretation would impermissibly 
create religious exemptions from land use and that “no such free pass for religious land uses 
masquerades among the legitimate protections RLUIPA affords.”135 
Other circuits have followed this approach.  For example, the Third Circuit held that a 
city’s denial of a variance to build a church in a commercial district did not constitute a 
substantial burden because the denial was not a “significantly great restriction” making religious 
                                                 
133 Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003). 
134 Id. at 760-61. However, the Seventh Circuit's inclusion of a requirement that the challenged 
governmental action be the “direct” cause of an effective impracticability of using the real property for 
religious purposes appears to be inconsistent with the test under the Free Exercise Clause stated by the 
Supreme Court in Sherbert. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 399, 404 (1963) (explaining that, if the 
purpose or effect of a law is to impede religious practice, the law is constitutionally invalid even though it 
has such effect only indirectly).  Thus, perhaps the more complete standard is one that either indirectly or 
directly makes religious exercise impracticable.  The issue is of little importance because the Supreme 
Court has shifted away from examining the directness or indirectness of the burden to instead the 
substantiality of the burden. Compare Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) and Sherbert, 374 U.S. 
at 404 with Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
135 Civil Liberties, 342 F.3d at 761. 
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exercise “effectively impracticable.”136  The Fifth Circuit, in the context of an institutionalized 
persons claim, held a “substantial burden” arises if government action “truly pressures the 
adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his religious 
beliefs.”137  Echoing the element of coercion necessary for a substantial burden, the Ninth 
Circuit held that a “substantial burden” must be “oppressive” and “render religious exercise 
effectively impracticable.”138  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit, in holding that a city requireme
limiting churches and synagogues to the central business district did not impose a significant 
burden to a synagogue who members did not live near by and had to walk farther to attend 
services.
nt 
ious 
rdingly.”  
139  The court defined a “substantial burden” as one that “directly coerces the relig
adherent to conform his or her behavior acco
 
Historic preservation laws, unless they make the practice of religion effectively impracticable, 
are not a substantial burden on religious exercise 
Historic preservation laws, while they add financial expense and inconvenience, do not 
necessarily rise to the level of a substantial burden.  In Episcopal Student Foundation v. City of 
Ann Arbor, the Eastern District of Michigan applied a narrow interpretation of substantial burden 
in the context of historic preservation.  The City of Ann Arbor denied a demolition permit to an 
Episcopal organization near the University of Michigan that sought to demolish its two-story 
building in a historic district.  The group alleged its ministry had outgrown the historic structure 
                                                 
136 Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 100 F. Appx. 70, 77 (3d Cir. 2004) (not 
precedential). 
137 Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004). 
138 San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004).  
139 Midrash Sephardi v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004).  
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and it wanted to erect a “large and multi-faceted church.”140  The organization wanted to cater to 
students, but alternative sites near the university campus were impossible to obtain.   
Nevertheless, the court found no substantial burden because the preservation ordinance’s 
financial burden and inconvenience did not “prevent the group from pursuing its religious 
beliefs, coerce its members into abandoning or violating those beliefs, or dissuade members from 
practicing their faith.”141  It explicitly rejected the idea that the financial burdens on the religious 
organization constituted a substantial burden.142  The court recommended a variety of 
alternatives, which included renting worship space in another facility or constructing an addition 
on the site.143   
Thus, the holding of Episcopal Student strongly supports the constitutionality of not 
exempting religious groups from historic preservation regulations.  In fact, the holding of 
Episcopal Student is in some regard even more compelling than St. Bartholomew’s because the 
building at issue in Episcopal Student—like Third Church—is used for worship, not merely 
social services or offices, as was the case in St. Bartholomew’s.  Thus, even though the building 
was more closely tied to a central religious exercise, the burden in not being able to demolish the 
structure was insufficient to violate the free exercise clause.   
 
Circuits retreat from narrow interpretation of substantial burden upon a colorable showing of 
religious discrimination 
However, several recent decisions have retreated from the narrow interpretation of 
                                                 
140 Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691, 694 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
141 Id. at 704. 
142 Id. at 706 (“Finally, although Canterbury House may incur additional financial burdens, such as rental 
expenses to accommodate its entire congregation on occasion, or if it seek additional growth, such 
financial burdens are not ‘substantial’ under RLUIPA.”). 
143 Id.  
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substantial burden. The Seventh Circuit, in the year after its decision in Civil Liberties, 
significantly broadened the scope of a substantial burden.  Distinguishing and not overruling 
Civil Liberties, the Seventh Circuit in Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church v. 
City of New Berlin held that “delay, uncertainty, and expense” resulting from the denial of a 
request to rezone for religious use constituted an impermissible substantial burden.144  The 
burden need “not be insuperable” to be substantial.145  However, in addition to the denial, the 
city had committed a series of legal errors, and the court found the mayor was “playing a 
delaying game,” and all this created the inference of less than good faith on the part of the 
city.146
uit, 
 
anation for denial despite the group’s good 
faith efforts to satisfy every mitigation condition.148  
 is not applicable to Third Church because no 
   
Similarly, in Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, the Ninth Circ
applying the reasoning of San Jose Christian, held that Sutter County’s repeated denials of a
conditional use permit to build a Sikh temple constituted a substantial burden.147  The court 
implied the possibility of subtle discrimination in the county’s denial, based upon the county’s 
inconsistent application of zoning law, its law of expl
 
A broad interpretation of substantial burden
evidence of religious discrimination exists 
New Berlin and Garu Nanak are distinguishable from Episcopal Student and the issue
Third Church because they raise issues of administrative incompetence or, at worst, discrete 
 in 
                                                 
144 396 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005); Lennington, supra note 26, at 821.  
145 New Berlin, 396 F.3d at 901.  
146 Id. at 899. 
147 Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). 
148 Id. at 990-91.  
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discrimination.  In contrast, the HPRB has signaled its willingness to work with Third Churc
reaching a compromise.
h in 
also 
lding.  
to adopt the term from the Seventh Circuit in Civil 
Liberties, “effectively impracticable.”  
 Third Church, they do not necessarily 
149  Moreover, the administrative record shows that the church was 
landmarked because it was an example of Brutalist architecture, not because the HPRB wanted 
to restrict the religious practice of the Christian Scientists.  New Berlin and Garu Nanak are 
distinguishable in that they deal with the siting and creation of new houses of worship.  By 
repeatedly denying the conditional use permit to the Sikhs, the County of Sutter was severely 
restricting their ability to locate.  But the burden involved in not being able to establish a house 
of worship is far greater than the burden in not being able to alter an established church bui
While the denials of siting approval do not directly coerce a religious adherent to alter his 
beliefs, it does make religious exercise, 
 
While preservation regulations impose financial costs on
rise to the level of a substantial burden on free exercise 
In contrast, preventing the demolition of Third Church of Christ, Scientist, would not 
necessarily make religious exercise “effectively impracticable” because religious exercise would 
continue as it had since the building was completed in 1971.  This makes Third Church differen
from other cases where courts have been willing to find a substantial burden when a church is 
denied a permit to construct a building for religious worship.
t 
aim that 
the church is unwelcoming and that it costs $8,000 to erect scaffolding to change the 
                                                
150  While congregants cl
 
149 Transcript of Dec. 6, 2007 HPRB hearing (on file with the Office of Historic Preservation).  
150 See Cottonwood Christian Ctr v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1226 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (“Preventing a church from building a worship site fundamentally inhibits its ability to practice its 
religion….If Cottonwood could not build a church, it could not exist.”); Elsinore Christian Ctr v. City of 
Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“Denial of the [conditional use permit] bars 
the Church’s use altogether, thereby imposing the ultimate burden on the use of that land.”). 
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lightbulbs,151 government actions that make the practice of religion more inconvenient or 
expensive—without making religious use impractical—have not been found to constitute a 
substantial burden upon religion.152   
Of course, this is not to say that a financial burden on religious exercise could never rise 
to the level of a significant burden.  Applying the test adopted by the Seventh Circuit and others, 
Third Church would have to show that its finances are in such poor shape that the maintenance 
costs made religious exercise “effectively impractical.”153  Considering that the congregation has 
declined from several hundred to approximately fifty or sixty weekly worshippers,154 this is not 
unrealistic.   
No court has decided what level of financial burden would amount to a substantial burden 
for either RLUIPA or First Amendment purposes,155 but based upon St. Bartholomew’s and 
Episcopal Student, the court’s inquiry would be detailed and searching.  To remain consistent 
with St. Bartholomew’s, Third Church would have to provide “financial projections or cash flow 
analyses” to prove financing of repairs and maintenance were infeasible and would “prohibit” 
religious exercise, not merely make it more difficult.156  In addition, the Second Circuit’s opinion 
implies that a court would not run afoul of the constitution by requiring Third Church to mount a 
                                                 
151 Charles Paul Freund, A Brutalist Bargain, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Dec. 18, 2007, available at 
http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=12460. 
152 See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
153 See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2003). 
154 See Schwartzman, supra note 6. 
155 The court in First Covenant held a substantial burden arose because the church’s property was reduced 
in value by 50%, but this was largely based on the Washington State constitution. First Covenant Church 
v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 182 (Wash. 1992). 
156 See St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2nd Cir. 1990) (quoting Lyng 
v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)) (“The crucial word in the constitutional 
text is ‘prohibit.’”) 
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good faith fundraising drive.157  While St. Bartholomew’s is a pre-RLUIPA case, using the St. 
Bartholomew’s analysis as a guide is appropriate because the legislative history of RLUIPA 
suggests that substantial burden should be interpreted in line with precedent.158 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 900 G Street Associates v. Department of 
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs held that an owner had to undertake good faith efforts to rent 
or sell the building before the court would make a finding of economic hardship.159  While 900 
G Street involved a takings claim of a commercial building and not free exercise claim, 
nevertheless reinforces the fact that a plaintiff carries a significant burden in alleging economic 
hardship.  The opinion in 900 G Street thus implies that Third Church may have to undertake 
good faith efforts to rent out parts of the building (perhaps for conferences) before the court 
would be willing to find the financial burdens substantial.   
it 
 
Substantial burden determination resembles Fifth Amendment takings analysis 
Third Church’s showing that religious exercise was “effectively impractical” therefore 
would be similar to the analysis of a Fifth Amendment takings claim. This is not to say that 
Third Church must bring a successful takings claim first, but merely that the level of the burden 
is very similar.160  
In Society for Ethical Culture v. Spratt, the Court of Appeals of New York rejected the 
claim that the landmark designation of a historic mansion used by a charitable organization 
                                                 
157 See id. at 359. 
158 See 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
159 430 A.2d 1387, 1391 (D.C. 1981). 
160 This paper does not fully explore a potential taking claim; this paragraph is included to illustrate how 
the showing of impracticability under RLUIPA is similar to a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. 
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constituted an unconstitutional taking.161  The court stated that the landmark designation of a 
non-profit organization would be constitutionally permissible so long as “it does not physically 
or financially prevent, or seriously interfere with the carrying out of the charitable purpose.”162  
The Society for Ethical Culture had claimed its historic building was ill-suited for its needs.  
However, the court said the society had not proved its activities within the building were 
“wrongfully disrupted” by the landmark designation and that the society was not entitled to put 
the property to its most beneficial use.163  The court in Ethical Culture distinguished an older 
case, Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, which had found that landmark 
designation to a church-owned property constituted a “naked taking.”164   
In Lutheran Church, the landmark structure had become so “hopelessly inadequate to the 
church needs” that had the regulations been applied, the charitable activity would have had no 
alternative but to cease.165  However, the Society for Ethical Culture—like Third Church—had 
not shown that the building was so “hopelessly inadequate” that the regulations would have had 
“no alternative” but to cause the charitable activity to cease.166  While Third Church could argue 
that the historic preservation regulations “seriously interfere” with their religious activity, Ethical 
Culture says that only when charitable activity would cease does the regulation work a taking.167   
Similarly, the Second Circuit stated in St. Bartholomew’s that a preservation law does not 
cause a taking—even though the regulation interfered with the church’s mission—because the 
                                                 
161 Society for Ethical Culture v. Spratt, 415 N.E.2d 922, 926 (N.Y. 1980). 
162 Id.  
163 Id. 
164 Id.  
165 Id.  
166 Id. 
167 See also Sailors’ Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968) (upholding landmark 
designation of historic building owned by charitable organization because the designation neither 
“physically or financially prevents” or “seriously interferes” with the organization’s charitable purpose.). 
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religious entity could continue its existing activities in its current facilities.168  In adapting the 
Supreme Court’s Penn Central test to property used for religious or charitable purposes, the 
court stated that “so long as the Church can continue to use its property in the way that it has 
been using it, there is no unconstitutional taking.”169  In essence, then, the trigger for a takings 
claim in both Ethical Culture and St. Bartholomew’s—the inability to continue use—is the same 
as for a free exercise claim: that religious exercise is “effectively impracticable.” 
 
D. Role for accommodation 
Considering that the law in this area is uncertain, the District would be well-served by 
offering to accommodate Third Church.  Accommodation does create a real problem in that a 
landmark is a landmark and each property is supposed to protected to the same extent as any 
other.  However, the political realities involved here as well as the burden shifting that RLUIPA 
imposes encourage accommodation.   
The statutory language of RLUIPA provides that the government can alleviate substantial 
burdens by proposing accommodations to religious entities.170  The legislative history of 
RLUIPA states that a claimant has the burden of showing that any proposed accommodation by 
the government to relieve the burden on religion is either “unreasonable or ineffective” before 
the claimant can prevail under the statute.171  As a consequence, assuming a substantial burden 
exists, the HPRB can propose a compromise—perhaps an alteration to the entrance to make it 
more welcoming—that addresses its preservation concerns as well as Third Church’s concerns, 
                                                 
168 See St. Bartholomew’s, 914 F.2d at 357. 
169 Id. 
170 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(e) (2000). 
171 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000). See Julia H. Miller, Regulating Historic Religious 
Properties Under RLUIPA, SM056 ALI-ABA 817, 829 (2007).  
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and Third Church would have to show the accommodation is “unreasonable or ineffective.”  
Accommodation is preferable because it reduces litigation costs and removes the controversy 
from the uncertainty of the courts.   
Accommodation is preferable for political reasons as well.  Even if a potential Third 
Church challenge to the Mayor’s Agent’s denial of a demolition permit were rejected in the 
courts, the controversy could jeopardize the District’s overall ability to protect churches.  The 
initial landmarking decision has caused vocal outrage from some segments in the community, 
and District of Columbia Councilmember Jack Evans introduced a bill (which he withdrew a few 
days later) that would exempt houses of worship from historic preservation laws upon a 
statement of opposition from the religious entity.172  While Evans’ proposal presents its own 
constitutional challenges—it might present an unconstitutional establishment of religion to allow 
religious entities to opt-out of historic preservation laws173—a similar law was enacted and 
upheld as constitutional in California.174 
The controversy from the case could jeopardize public support of including religious 
buildings within the overall historic preservation regime.175  Preservationists should want to 
prevent a law like California’s from being adopted in the District.   Therefore, while the 
                                                 
172 Bill on file with author. 
173 To avoid an Establishment clause violation under the Supreme Court’s test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, a 
government action or law must “have a secular legislative purpose;” its “principal or primary effect” must 
“neither advance[] nor inhibit[] religion,” and it must not foster “‘excessive government entanglement 
with religion.’” 403 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
Exempting only religious properties arguably has neither a secular purpose nor a secular effect. 
174 See East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000). The California law 
exempts all non-commercial properties from historic preservation laws if the organization objects to 
application of the regulations and makes a declaration in a public forum that it would suffer substantial 
hardship if the regulations were applied. See Felipe M. Nunez & Eric Seidman, California’s Statutory 
Exemption For Religious Properties From Preservation Ordinances: A Constitutional and Policy 
Analysis, 12 J.L & RELIGION 271-322 (1995). 
175 Local media figures and property rights advocates have severely criticized the HPRB’s decision to 
landmark Third Church.  See Fisher, supra note 7. 
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preservation laws stand a good chance of surviving a free exercise and RLUIPA challenge by 
Third Church, the realities of preserving the integrity of preservation laws as applied to religious 
structures urge efforts to accommodate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Historic preservation of religious properties poses numerous constitutional and policy 
questions.  The legality of historic preservation in the context of religious properties is more 
uncertain because the religious entities have a constitutional protection to free exercise that 
ordinary landowners do not enjoy.  The discrepancy in case law reflects the difficulty courts 
having in applying free exercise jurisprudence to this area.  Despite the uncertainty and 
sometimes conflicting opinions, the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in St. Bartholomew’s 
and its vacation of First Covenant during the same term strongly suggest that the Court would 
not consider the preservation of a religious property to be a violation of the free exercise clause.   
Similarly, the decision in Episcopal Student, which is factually similar to the situation 
involving Third Church, suggests that the denial of a demolition permit would not be a 
substantial burden on religious exercise under RLUIPA.  These two decisions, particularly in 
light of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ preservation-friendly opinions in 
Metropolitan Baptist and Embassy Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. District of Columbia,176 greatly 
reduces the probability of a successful lawsuit by Third Church.  In order to prevail, Third 
Church would have to show that the preservation regulations made its religious exercise 
“effectively impracticable.”  
But the tension between preservation of churches and religious exercise will only become 
                                                 
176 Embassy Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. District of Columbia, No. 06-AA-1083 (D.C. Mar. 20, 2008).  
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more pronounced as congregations with historic churches suffer from shrinking 
congregations.177  Faced with increased maintenance costs and decreased attendance and tithing
this may be the first of many su
, 
ch challenges.  
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
177 For example, the diocese of Pittsburgh closed over 40 churches from 1988-94. Megan McCloskey, 
Historic Church Closes Its Doors Forever, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Dec. 7, 2004. In Boston, the Roman 
Catholic archdiocese recently closed 83 churches, many of them historic. Marilyn M. Fenollosa, The 
Boston Archdiocese Parish Closing Process, in QUEL AVENIR POUR QUELLES EGLISES? at 139 (2007).  
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APPENDIX A 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc (2000) 
Protection of land use as religious exercise 
 
(a) Substantial burdens 
(1) General rule 
government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a 
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or 
institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 
person, assembly, or institution-- 
 (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
 (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
(2) Scope of application 
This subsection applies in any case in which-- 
 (A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal 
financial assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability; 
 (B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, 
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability; or 
 (C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation 
or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place 
formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, 
individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved. 
  
(b) Discrimination and exclusion 
(1) Equal terms 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a 
religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or 
institution. 
(2) Nondiscrimination 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates 
against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination. 
(3) Exclusions and limits 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that-- 
(A) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction; or 
(B) unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a 
jurisdiction. 
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APPENDIX B 
D.C. Code § 6-1104(e) (2000)   
 
(1) In any instance where there is a claim of unreasonable economic hardship, the owner shall 
submit, by affidavit, to the Mayor at least 20 days prior to the public hearing, at least the 
following information: 
(A) For all property: 
(i) The amount paid for the property, the date of purchase and the party from whom 
purchased, including a description of the relationship, if any, between the owner and the 
person from whom the property was purchased;  
(ii) The assessed value of the land and improvements thereon according to the two most 
recent assessments; 
(iii) Real estate taxes for the previous two years; 
(iv) Annual debt service, if any, for the previous two years; 
(v) All appraisals obtained within the previous two years by the owner or applicant in 
connection with his purchase, financing or ownership of the property; 
(vi) Any listing of the property for sale or rent, price asked, and offers received, if any; 
and 
(vii) Any consideration by the owner as to profitable adaptive uses for the property; 
and 
(B) For income-producing property: 
(i) Annual gross income from the property for the previous two years; 
(ii) Itemized operating and maintenance expenses for the previous two years; 
(iii) Annual cash flow, if any, for the previous two years. 
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